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Chapter 10
Outsourcing Pension Longevity Protection
Igor Balevich
Employer-provided defined benefit (DB) pension plans were a key compo-
nent of the traditional ‘three-legged stool’ of retirement income in decades
past, with the other two legs being Social Security and personal saving.
Despite the steady decrease in the number of US participants covered by
employer-sponsored DB plans over time and the sudden drop in value of
retirement assets in 2008, $2 trillion of assets still remain in private DB
plans and $3.5 trillion in government pension plans as of the end of 2008
(Investment Company Institute 2009). One of the valuable features of DB
plans, when compared to the increasingly common defined contribution
(DC) plan, is that the default form of benefit payment has been an annuity
with payments continuing for at least the lifetime of the employee.
Managing a DB plan has proven to be a difficult task over the past 10
years. The early part of the decade was marked with significant funding
declines (assets minus liabilities) and increases in the number of plan
changes that either reduced or eliminated future benefit accruals. After
many pensions worked their way back to a decent funded status by the end
of 2007, capital market conditions in 2008 reversed all of the gains from the
previous 5 years. Many corporate pension plans were in the process of
deciding whether or how to implement liability-driven investing (LDI)
strategies when the market turmoil struck. Ironically, such strategies
could have helped protect against the volatile 2008 market conditions.
The last decade has also led to greater focus on the volatility of plan costs.
In the United States, little attention has been devoted to mortality assump-
tions and their impact on costs. Yet this pattern is changing due to the 2006
Pension Protection Act (PPA) requirements to update mortality assump-
tions more frequently, as well as refinements in risk management strate-
gies.
This chapter discusses mortality trends, the impact of longevity assump-
tions on pensions, and factors that drive plan sponsors’ decisions on
whether to outsource longevity exposure. We first review general popula-
tion mortality improvement trends in the United States. Despite fairly
steady improvement trends over most of the last century, opinions vary
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greatly on whether these trends will continue in the future. Although the
mortality levels of people covered by pension plans tend to be lower than
those of the general population, many of the methods and reasoning used
to model general population mortality can be applied to pensions as well.
Next we examine the impact of longevity assumptions and experience on
pension plan liabilities. A comparison of the magnitude of this risk relative
to the capital market risks can be informative in understanding whether
and how pension plans sponsors may decide to outsource this risk. Finally,
we discuss ways in which longevity exposures can be managed or out-
sourced. These include plan design changes to shift longevity risk to
employees, transferring the risk to insurance companies, and hedging
without completely eliminating longevity risk.
Longevity trends and estimation
There is little dispute that life spans have increased significantly and fairly
steadily over most of the last century. Nevertheless, there is considerable
debate and disagreement over whether this trend will continue in the
future, whether the mortality improvements will accelerate, or whether
they will slow or even reverse for some generations. Similarly, although
there are many ways of modeling future mortality rates, currently there is
no single widely accepted best method for doing this. These varied views
could be refined and converge as more people focus their attention on the
impact of mortality on pensions.
Historic mortality trends
Life expectancy at birth in the United States has increased from 58.3 years
in 1934 to 75.2 years in 2005 for males, and from 62.4 years in 1934 to 80.4
years in 2005 for females (Human Mortality Database 2008). On average,
life expectancies increased by just under 0.24 years for males and just over
0.25 years for females, for each calendar year over this time period. Note
that these are period life expectancies, indicating how long someone born in
a given year would live if he or she experienced mortality rates equal to
those calculated for each age in that year. This is generally not a true
estimate of how long a person born in a given year is actually expected to
live, since period life expectancy does not take into account the projected
changes in mortality rates that a person would actually experience over
their lifetime. Nonetheless, it is still a useful measure to illustrate trends in
mortality rates over time (Figure 10.1).
Despite a relatively steady historic long-term increase in life expectancy
at birth, there are vastly different views on whether this trend will continue
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in the future. At one end of the spectrum, some argue that there are
biological limits to the increases in life spans (Carnes, Olshansky, and
Grahn 2003), and that factors such as childhood obesity will even decrease
life expectancy for younger generations (Olshansky et al. 2005). Oppo-
nents point to the lack of evidence of a limit to life expectancy (Oeppen
and Vaupel 2002). One extreme point of view is that regenerative medicine
could possibly halt the aging process and that the first person to live to
1,000 years old might be alive today (de Grey and Rae 2007). This broad
range of opinions illustrates the challenges involved in accurately modeling
future mortality rates.
Modeling future mortality
Projecting future mortality rates for a given population involves estimating
four elements: current mortality rates for the population, long-term trends,
short-term derivations from the trend, and infrequent onetime shocks.
Stochastic mortality simulations can use separate distributions for each of
the elements, or they may utilize a model with parameters that can estimate
their impacts.
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Figure 10.1 United States life expectancy at birth (period table). Source : Author’s
calculations derived from Human Mortality Database (2008).
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The difference between the best estimate of current mortality rates and
actual rates for the population is referred to as the basis. Since the actual
rates are generally not known in advance, even for fully medically under-
written populations, it is important to estimate the magnitude of a confi-
dence band around the best estimate to understand the basis risk of the
projection. The long-term trend is generally assumed to capture reductions
in the mortality rates over time due to medical advances. But as noted,
there is much disagreement over how this long-term trend will change over
time. Short-term deviations from the trend are typically small and random;
they account for minor factors not included in the model explicitly. Infre-
quent onetime shocks can have a significant impact on mortality and
examples include infectious diseases, natural disasters, and acts of war or
terrorism.
There are many different types of projection models, and it is important
to keep in mind the purpose of the projection when selecting a model in
order to ensure the results are appropriate. Classes of models include those
that extrapolate the trends of the calibrating past time horizon and those
that rely heavily on expert opinion for inputs such as the likelihood of a
disease being cured or the ultimate upper bound on life spans. Statistical
extrapolation models are generally more appropriate for shorter projec-
tion periods; models that incorporate some degree of expert opinion (or
range of expert opinions) seem more appropriate for long projections.
Olshanksy (1988) discusses various types of models and considerations for
projecting mortality rates. Cairns et al. (2007) compare the results of eight
statistical models for projecting mortality rates. In addition to selecting a
model appropriate for its intended usage, careful attention should also be
paid to the assumptions used for model calibration and the resulting
model parameters. A given model can produce significantly different re-
sults when calibrated differently.
Mortality assumptions for pension plans
Long-term trends in mortality rates for employees covered by pension
plans have been broadly similar to trends for the US general population.
However, mortality rates for employees covered by pension plans are typi-
cally lower than for the general population. This relationship makes intui-
tive sense, since those covered by pensions sponsored by their employers
usually also have some sort of employer-sponsored medical coverage. The
period life expectancy at birth for 2000 is 74.3 years for males and 79.6 for
females for the US population (HumanMortality Database 2008), while the
period life expectancy at birth using the RP-2000 mortality table (common-
ly used for pension valuations) is 78.4 years for males and 81.6 years for
females (see Figure 10.2).
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Mortality assumptions for pension liability valuations have historically
received little attention in the United States. Traditionally, the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) has updated the required mortality table for pen-
sion current liability calculations approximately every decade. These tables
were static, where the same rates were used for all future years. It was fairly
rare for projected improvements to be explicitly calculated for future years
within a valuation or for future valuations after the table was initially
adopted. This approach then produced liability jumps whenever a new
table was adopted.
The PPA changed the way mortality assumptions are to be used for
pension plan purposes. Starting with 2008 valuations, there are generally
applicable mortality tables, based on the RP-2000 mortality tables as well as
guidance for the use of plan-specific mortality tables. Future mortality
improvements can be included in one of two ways: one uses static tables
with improvements projected for 7 years after the valuation date for
annuitants and projected for 15 years after the valuation date for non-
annuitants. Another uses projection Scale AA to calculate rates for each
future year. The plan-specific mortality tables can be used instead of
generally applicable mortality tables if certain conditions are met. These
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Figure 10.2 Ratio of RP-2000 combined healthy mortality rates to 2000 US popula-
tion mortality rates. Sources: Author’s calculations derived from Human Mortality
Database (2008) and Society of Actuaries (2000).
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changes will allow for more accurate and updated liability calculations
(Figure 10.3).
It is interesting to note that the United Kingdom uses far more conser-
vative mortality assumptions than the United States. It is estimated that
pension liabilities in many countries would increase by 10–15 percent if
assumptions similar to those in the United Kingdom were used (Hewitt
Associates 2008).
Impact of longevity on pension plans
Next we analyze the impact of various mortality assumptions on life expec-
tancies and pension liabilities. The assumptions are based on the 1983
GAM table, the RP-2000 table, projection Scale AA, as well as ad hoc
adjustments to the underlying mortality table and improvement factors.
The calculations are based on a sample plan consisting of retirees and
terminated vested participants who have not yet commenced payments.
In Figure 10.4, we note that the impact of moving from the 1983 GAM
table to the RP-2000 table is not as significant as one might expect. Life
expectancy at birth increases 0.5 years, from 79.3 to 79.8. The life expec-
tancy at age 65 is the same. Although the underlying data for the 1983 GAM
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Figure 10.3 Annual mortality improvement factors using projection Scale AA.
Source : Author’s calculations derived from Society of Actuaries (2000).
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table is from the 1960s, it was projected forward to 1983 and a 10 percent
margin was applied for conservatism. The minimal impact shown is due to
the fact that our mortality comparison uses a blend of 50 percent of the
male and 50 percent of the female rates. The mortality rates of the RP-2000
table are lower for males and higher for females when compared to the
1983 GAM table.
The impact of using a projection scale has a significant impact on life
expectancies as does applying an adjustment factor to the rates of an
underlying table (Table 10.1). Life expectancy at birth increases from
79.8 to 85.1 years when Scale AA is applied to the RP-2000 table. Applying
an adjustment factor of 75 percent to the RP-2000 table projected with
Scale AA increases the life expectancy at birth by 2.6 to 87.7 years.
The liabilities increase by 2.6 percent when applying Scale AA to the RP-
2000 table. The increase in liabilities of applying projection Scale AA is
3 percent when the benefit payments are increased by 1.5 percent after
retirement (Table 10.2). Postretirement benefit increases enhance the
impact on liabilities of changes in mortality assumptions. They are more
common among pension plans in the United Kingdom and government
pension plans in the United States, than among US corporate plans. The
liabilities increase by 6.4 percent when reducing the Scale AA projected RP-
2000 rates by 25 percent. This increase illustrates the potential basis risk of
the underlying mortality assumption and the importance of trying to
-
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estimate mortality rates as closely as possible. As an example of the poten-
tial difference in mortality rates for different employee groups, it is esti-
mated that workers in the primary metal industries have mortality rates
over 30 percent higher, and workers in the petroleum industry have mor-
tality rates over 20 percent lower than those in the RP-2000 table for ages 60
through 80 (Society of Actuaries 2000).
Table 10.1 Life expectancy at birth and age 65 using various mortality assumptions
Mortality assumptiona Life expectancy at birth Life expectancy at age 65
1983 GAM 79.3 18.7
RP-2000 combined healthy 79.8 18.7
RP-2000, projected Scale AA 85.1 19.5
RP-2000  75%, Scale AAb 87.7 21.9
RP-2000, Scale AA þ 1%c 91.7 20.7
a All mortality assumptions use blended rates (50% male, 50% female).
b Mortality adjustment factor applied to mortality rates below terminal age (120).
c Scale AA improvement factors plus 1% applied to mortality rates at all ages below age 101.
Source : Author’s calculations; derived from Society of Actuaries (2002).
Table 10.2 Liability values using various mortality assumptionsa
Mortality assumptionb No postretirement
benefit increases
1.5% postretirement
benefit increases
TVsc Retirees Total TVsc Retirees Total
1983 GAM 263,043 178,957 442,000 299,680 202,256 501,936
RP-2000 combined healthy 264,011 180,535 444,546 300,786 204,018 504,803
RP-2000, projected Scale AA 268,746 187,150 455,896 307,411 212,671 520,081
RP-2000  75%, Scale AAd 284,724 200,434 485,158 328,659 230,074 558,733
RP-2000, Scale AA þ 1%e 275,553 195,701 471,254 317,349 224,532 541,881
a Liability calculations use 6% discount rate.
b All mortality assumptions use blended rates (50% male, 50% female).
c Terminated vested participants (TVs).
d Mortality adjustment factor applied to mortality rates below terminal age (120).
e Scale AA improvement factors plus 1% applied to mortality rates at all ages below age 101.
Source : Author’s calculations; derived from Society of Actuaries (2002).
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Magnitude of longevity risk relative to other risks
It is instructive to calculate the size of mortality-related risks, compared to a
few of the main financial market risks on the funded status of our sample
pension plan. Of the factors included, equities have the largest impact with
one standard deviation event over a 1-year period leading to an 8.6 percent
change in funded status. Interest rate risk is the next largest factor, having a
6.6 percent impact on funded status. The basis risk of estimating the true
mortality of the underlying population has a 6.4 percent impact while the
risk of the longevity improvement trend has a 3.4 percent impact. The
mortality-related factors are nearly 20 percent larger for a plan where the
benefits increase with inflation after retirement.
Our funded status risk calculations make many simplifying assumptions.
We assumed that the sample plan was 80 percent funded with an asset
allocation of 60 percent equities and 40 percent medium duration fixed
income. The risk impacts shown are the stand-alone risks for that factor.
With the exception of offsetting the interest rate risk to the liabilities with
the fixed income asset allocation, we incorporate no reductions for risk
diversification. For simplicity, we do not illustrate the impact of credit
spreads on the funded status risk, though these were one of the main
drivers of funded status changes on an accounting basis for plans in 2008.
One problem that arises when illustrating the magnitude of the mortality-
related risks is that it is difficult to calibrate the likelihood of a particular
change. It may be possible to show the likelihood of a change in the long-
term improvement trend, but it is quite difficult to estimate the likelihood
of an estimate of the underlying mortality basis risk for a pension popula-
tion. For these reasons, the mortality-related risks we included apply a
75 percent factor to the mortality rates to illustrate the basis risk, while
the improvement trend is estimated by adding 1 percent per year to the
Scale AA improvement rates.
Deciding whether to outsource longevity
Plan sponsors have many factors to consider when deciding whether to
outsource the longevity exposure in their DB plans. One factor is the
magnitude of the risk individually, and compared to other risks. Others
include which alternatives are available to manage the risk as well as
whether it should be managed on its own or in combination with other
risk exposures. A cost/benefit analysis can be performed to compare the
effectiveness of managing the longevity risk compared to other risks. As an
example, it may not make sense for a plan sponsor to spend more time and
money managing plan longevity risk alone, if it is cheaper and results in
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greater overall funded status risk reduction to focus on the interest rate or
equity investment exposures.
The global financial crisis has prompted pension sponsors to focus more
than ever on ways to reduce the funded status volatility of their plans (see
Figure 10.5). After recovering approximately half of the over 47 percent
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Figure 10.5 Defined benefit funding patterns over time. Panel A: Funded status for
pensions sponsored by Standard & Poor’s 500 companies. Panel B: Funded status
for 100 largest corporate pension plans in the United States. Sources: Panel A
derived from Silverblatt and Guarino (2009). Panel B derived from Milliman
(2009b).
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decrease in funded status experienced from the end of 1999 through the
end of 2002, the funded status for the largest US plans fell over 30 percent
between the end of 2007 and the end of February 2009 (Silverblatt and
Guarino 2009; Milliman 2009a, b). Even companies that had focused al-
most entirely on asset-only measurement metrics are now seeking to better
match their liabilities. Since exposures to financial market movements
were the main drivers of the decrease in funding during 2008, and these
comprise the largest portion of funded status risk, most of the risk reduc-
tion effort is focused on the financial risks. More plan sponsors are adopt-
ing LDI strategies to limit their exposure to financial market risks due to
equity and other return-seeking investments, as well as the impact of
interest rates and credit spreads on liability discounting. In the process,
the risk due to mortality-related factors will become a larger proportion of
the funded status risk. As the proportion of longevity-related funded status
risk increases, the underlying mortality assumptions are updated more
frequently, and strategies for managing longevity are refined, it seems
inevitable that more plan sponsors take action.
Alternatives for longevity management
Plan sponsors have several alternatives to manage longevity exposure, and
more are being developed. These include plan design changes, contracts
with insurance companies that eliminate the longevity risk and typically
other risks as well, and newer strategies that isolate the longevity risk and
look like contracts typically used for financial market exposures. The alter-
natives differ by complexity, amount of risk transferred, and the period of
time for which they are in effect.
Plan Design
Many DB pension plans have been at least partially replaced with DC plans
(including 401(k)s) over the last decade. This change in plan design shifts
the longevity risk as well as investment risk from plan sponsors to partici-
pants. To protect against outliving their assets, individual participants may
purchase annuities from insurance companies. In order to address the
higher cost of purchasing annuities individually, plan sponsors can con-
tract with insurance companies to provide annuities at institutional prices.
These annuity options can be outside the DC plan, part of the plan as a
benefit payment election at retirement, or part of the plan as an investment
choice that adds to the annuity as assets are accumulated during employ-
ment.
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Although plan sponsors have been changing plan designs from DB to
DC, it is believed that DB plans are more efficient for providing a sufficient
level of retirement income to participants. Some reasons include the
longer investment horizon and greater investment expertise of institutions
sponsoring pension plans compared to the individual participants. Anoth-
er reason is that pension plans cover a large number of participants, so
gains and losses from the idiosyncratic longevity risks of the individual
participants can balance out. One estimate of the cost reduction due to
longevity pooling in a pension plan is 15 percent (Almeida and Fornia
2008).
New plan designs will likely emerge in the future, melding traditional DB
plans where the sponsor bears all of the risks with DC plans where partici-
pants bear the majority of the risks. A discussion on potential methods to
share the risks between sponsors and participants is taking place in the
United Kingdom (Department for Work and Pensions 2008), and at least
one plan sponsor in the United Kingdom has successfully implemented a
plan change that shared the longevity risk between the sponsor and parti-
cipants in the DB plan. Effective starting in 2006, BAE Systems introduced a
Longevity Adjustment Factor, which reduces a portion of the pension
benefits as life expectancies rise (BAE Systems 2006). Another method
being discussed to share the longevity risk is to increase the retirement
age as life expectancies increase. New design innovations could be driven
by UK risk-sharing consultancies spurred by plan sponsor interest in man-
aging risks without completely shifting them to the participants.
Transfer risk to insurance companies
The traditional method of eliminating all of the risks of sponsoring a DB
plan (including longevity) is plan termination. In a standard termination,
the plan has enough assets to pay all of the accrued benefits and the plan
either purchases annuities from an insurance company or pays benefits as a
lump sum. After a typical standard termination, all of the sponsors’ obliga-
tions and responsibilities associated with the plan are eliminated (except
for any misrepresentations in the annuity contract). Although many plans
terminate each year, that vast majority are very small plans. More than 1,200
plans went through a standard termination in 2007 in the United States,
but 75 percent of the plans had fewer than 25 participants. These termina-
tions represented payments of $3.1 billion, with $1.9 billion of lump-sum
payments and $1.2 billion of group annuity premiums (Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation 2008).
Purchasing a group annuity contract from an insurance company to
terminate a plan (sometimes referred to as a buyout) is often perceived
as being expensive. When pricing terminal annuities, insurance companies
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use assumptions between best estimates and a worst-case scenario, which
often end up being more conservative than the assumptions used to calcu-
late liabilities for ongoing funding and accounting purposes. In particular,
the mortality assumption used by insurers includes projections for future
mortality improvements. Now that the PPA requires some sort of projected
improvements to be factored into liability calculations for funding pur-
poses, these improvements will likely be adopted for accounting purposes
as well. This will reduce the gap between the cost of annuities and the
ongoing liabilities.
Another change in the PPA that could make standard terminations less
costly for those offering lump-sum payment options is a change in the
applicable interest rate. Regulators have required changing the rate used
to compute lump sums from Treasury yields to corporate bond yields, to be
fully phased in for plan years starting in 2012. Nevertheless, while the
difference between the liabilities calculated for funding or accounting
purposes and annuity purchases is decreasing, plan terminations will still
be viewed as costly in most cases. Most plans are significantly underfunded
on an accounting basis as of the end of 2008 and will need to fund this
shortfall in order to purchase annuities.
There are also alternatives referred to as partial buyouts where certain
risks can be transferred to an insurance company. Partial buyouts can be
structured to cover only a portion of the liabilities; they can also transfer
the risks for only a portion of the participants (e.g., retirees in payment
status only) or for only a portion of the benefits (e.g., up to $1,000 per
month per participant). Partial buyouts of the retirees only can be a cost-
effective way to reduce liabilities and risk, since the cost of purchasing
annuities for retirees is typically closer to the ongoing accounting liability
than for active employees or those terminated but not yet in payments
status. It is important to monitor whether a partial termination would occur
when considering a partial buyout, since this could require full vesting of
all participants. Another alternative to a buyout is a buy-in. In a buy-in, an
annuity contract is purchased from an insurance company but, rather than
transferring the liabilities to the insurance company, the annuity contract is
held as an investment in the asset portfolio. Buy-ins do not reduce the
liabilities but can reduce the risk similar to buyouts. Since buy-ins can be
viewed as purchasing an investment rather than eliminating a liability,
some of the rules governing buyouts, like partial terminations, should not
be of concern. Buy-ins are more common when covering only a portion of
the participants.
There has been much effort over the past few years to develop innovative
alternatives to plan terminations involving group annuity contracts from an
insurance company. A number of companies have been established in the
United Kingdom to challenge the two dominant insurance companies in
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this market. Many of the newer companies in the United Kingdom are also
set up as insurance companies. This market saw around £8 billion in
transactions in 2008, with most of the transaction volume being buy-ins
for retirees (LCP 2009b).
In the United States, several large investment banks announced their
presence in the buyout market also with a few startup companies backed by
private equity firms. In contrast to the majority of new entrants in the
United Kingdom, most new US entrants were not set up as insurance
companies. The intended structure of these noninsurance buyouts was to
maintain the pension plan but transfer all of the responsibilities for
sponsoring the plan to a new company. Yet before this market had a
chance to take off, the US Treasury Department and IRS issued a ruling
banning these transactions (Internal Revenue Service 2008). In conjunc-
tion with the ruling, the Treasury released a framework for future legisla-
tion consisting of conditions under which a noninsurance buyout could be
allowed (United States Treasury Department 2008). It is interesting to note
that the ruling covers transactions where the sponsorship of an entire plan
is transferred to another company. There appears to be room for innova-
tions where an insurance-based buyout is the first step toward sharing the
risk with a noninsurance company or even noninsurance-based buy-ins.
However, since many of the companies that had been pursuing new solu-
tions in this market are currently capital-constrained and most pension
plans now have a low funded status, new ideas in this area may not develop
rapidly.
Hedging longevity risk
In recent years, products are being developed to hedge, rather than
completely eliminate, longevity risk. Some target the longevity risk only,
leaving it up to the plan sponsor’s investment committee to decide whether
to combine this with any risk management strategy addressing financial
market risks. Several investment banks have introduced indices to help
trade longevity products in the United States. Other companies in the
United States are evaluating this area and there are even more companies
in the United Kingdom actively pursuing this market.
One instrument that can be used to hedge longevity risk is a longevity
swap. A longevity swap is similar in concept to an interest rate swap.
A pension plan executing a longevity swap would agree to make fixed
payments over the term of the contract based on future mortality expecta-
tions in return for receiving floating payments based on the actual mortali-
ty experience of the underlying population. For a swap meant to cover a
group of retirees currently receiving payments that do not increase with
inflation, the fixed payments would be a series of amounts that decrease
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over time as the participants die and benefit payments cease. If longevity
improvements are greater than anticipated, more participants will be re-
ceiving benefits than expected, and the pension plan will receive more in
floating payments than the fixed amounts it pays. This gain on the longevi-
ty swap in the asset portfolio would help to offset the mortality loss experi-
enced on the liabilities. It is important to note that these contracts will have
an expiry date much shorter than the length of time over which a typical
pension plan is expected to pay benefits. However, it is possible to combine
swaps having various maturities in different amounts to try to match the
sensitivity of the liability to changes in mortality experience and longevity
expectations. The mortality assumptions used to calculate the pension
plan’s liabilities should be examined in light of any longevity hedge trans-
action to make sure they are updated frequently to avoid any mismatch
where changes in the value of the hedge are not recognized similarly in the
liability calculations.
Credit Suisse, JPMorgan, and Goldman Sachs have released longevity
indices in the United States with the intention of trading derivative or
other financial contracts linked to the indices (Credit Suisse 2009; Gold-
man Sachs 2009; JPMorgan 2009). The indices include either the future
expected lifetimes, mortality rates, or impact of mortality on a group of
lives. Some of the index data is split into subindices, divided by age and
gender. The Credit Suisse and JPMorgan indices are based on national
population data and are updated annually, but with a time lag. The Gold-
man Sachs indices are based on an insured population of senior citizens
and are updated monthly. One of the key considerations when evaluating
hedging the longevity risk of a pension plan with a product based on the
mortality experience of a different population is the basis risk. It is possi-
ble to minimize this basis risk if the true underlying mortality of both
populations is known. However, since only a range for the true mortality of
the pension plan will be known, the ability to reduce the basis risk is
limited. For example, if the hedge is calibrated assuming the true under-
lying mortality of the pension population was 105 percent of the RP-2000
rates but the actual mortality experienced is 75 percent of the RP-2000
rates, the hedge would not be as effective as anticipated. Instruments
based on longevity indices can be quite effective at hedging the longevity
trends but not as effective for the basis risk. A few of the significant
benefits of a bank trading many contracts based on the same populations
are potentially increased liquidity of the product and potentially reduced
cost.
Themarket for longevity derivatives in the US appears to be in its infancy.
As was the case with other types of pension risk management strategies and
trends, it can be helpful to look at the market in the United Kingdom as a
potential guide for what may develop in the United States. There have been
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longevity-only trades in the United Kingdom but, until recently, these have
been with insurance or reinsurance companies managing their annuity
books containing pension annuities. The first longevity transaction
structured as a derivative took place at the beginning of 2008 between
pension buyout company Lucida and JPMorgan. The first longevity swap
directly with a pension fund took place in June 2009 between Babcock
International and Credit Suisse. In July 2009, the Royal & Sun Alliance
pension scheme entered into a deal with Goldman Sachs and its insur-
ance company subsidiary Rothesay Life that included interest rate and
longevity risks. These deals should add credence to recent consultant
predictions that the longevity swap market will grow rapidly in the next
year. Further evidence of the market growth is displayed by over £30
billion of quotations on pension liabilities issued by longevity hedge
providers in the last 12 months (LCP 2009a).
Hedging or transferring longevity risk has received much attention in
the United Kingdom and the United States. It seems only a matter of time
before transactions with pension plans become more common. There are
various developments, not all related to product innovations, which can
help spur the growth of the market for hedging longevity risk. As noted
earlier, increased adoption of LDI programs to manage the financial risks
will draw more attention to the longevity risk as it becomes a relatively
larger portion of the total plan risk. UK pension plans are further ahead of
those in the United States in this respect, since LDI is more prevalent and
the longevity risk is more significant due to postretirement benefits being
indexed to inflation.
Understanding the true best estimate mortality assumptions and their
impact on the pension liabilities is another factor that will benefit the
longevity hedging market. Again, pensions in the United Kingdom are
ahead of those in the United States in this respect. The cost of implement-
ing a longevity hedge is a critical factor for the potential growth of this
market. Pricing in the United Kingdom has recently become more com-
petitive but this has not yet spread to the United States. Another key
element in longevity market growth is the ability to understand and handle
the basis risk between the hedge and the pension liability. While hedging
products based on broad population indices could ultimately be more cost-
effective than bespoke solutions, index-based products suffer from a larger
basis risk. Finally, examples of plans successfully implementing longevity
hedges are also important for market growth. This has just started in the
United Kingdom but we have not seen visible signs of an imminent trans-
action in the United States. Although the United States seems to be behind
the United Kingdom in all of these respects, the United States can observe
how the market evolves overseas and then apply similar ideas there. This
can ultimately allow for more rapid market growth, once it begins.
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Additional discussions on pension risk transfer developments involving
longevity in the United Kingdom appear in Hymans Robertson (2009),
Lucida (2009), and Punter Southall (2009). A discussion of how some risk
transfer strategies may evolve in the United States in light of developments
in the United Kingdom appears in Monk (2009).
Conclusion
Despite the controversy over whether historic mortality improvements will
continue at the same pace as they have in the past, there is little debate that
longevity assumptions and experience have a significant impact on pension
plans. The attention being paid to the impact of mortality on pension plans
is set to increase as the PPA requires more realistic and frequently updated
assumptions. Furthermore, as more plans adopt LDI strategies, the portion
of total funded status risk due to mortality should increase.
There are a variety of ways pension plans can reduce their mortality risk.
These vary from plan design changes that impact only the liabilities to
buyouts that transfer all of the risks (and generally all of the assets) to a
third party. New solutions are being developed to hedge the longevity risk
without eliminating it. Given the amount of focus in this area and recent
market developments in the United Kingdom, it seems a matter of time
before additional solutions to the longevity issue become more prevalent.
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